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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
L. K. CALDWELL*
The two hundredth anniversary year of the birth of
Thomas Jefferson affords an appropriate occasion for a re-
view of the contribution of America's second lawyer president
to the theory and application of law.
In the two centuries which have elapsed since Jefferson's
birth at Shadwell in Albemarle County, Virginia, April 13
(April 2nd, old calendar) 1743, there have been few issues in
the realm of law and politics to which Jefferson has not in
some respect contributed. But the continuing relevance of
Jefferson's thought is not due so much to an unusual gift
of political prescience as to a concern with the fundamental
bases of human conduct. Jefferson's approach to law was
characterized by a searching inquiry into its purposes and
hence to its origins. It is this aspect of his legal philosophy
which is of perennial interest to students and practitioners
of the law. With the views of Jefferson on the judiciary we
shall not here be concerned. The story of his feud with John
Marshall and the Federalist judges may be left to Corwin,
Warren, and Beveridge who have told it fully and told it well.
Rather the purpose of this article is to present Jefferson's
understanding of the nature and purpose of law in the
American commonwealth and to ascertain the nature of his
contribution to American jurisprudence.
I
Jefferson's legal experience began in 1760 when he en-
rolled in the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg,
capital of colonial Virginia. Here he became a student and
friend of George Wythe, the most distinguished legal scholar
of the Old Dominion. And after two years of general educa-
tion in the college and of cultural and intellectual growth
obtaining from contact with such liberal and versatile men
as Francis Fauquier, acting Governor of the Colony, and Dr.
William Small, professor of mathematics and philosophy,
Jefferson at the age of 19 entered Wythe's law office to
prepare for the bar examinations. There being no regularly
* Executive Secretary, Indiana University, South Bend-Mishawaka
Extension Center.
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organized law school at Williamsburg, candidates for the
legal profession had to prepare on their own initiative for
examinations administered by leading members of the Bar.
The usual procedure was to study under the direction of an
established lawyer, to attend the sessions of the court, to
prepare sample briefs, and read the basic tracts on law. The
length of training depended upon the application and self-
assurance of the candidate. Patrick Henry is said to have
passed his examination after six months of study, whereas
the more thorough and less confident Jefferson did not con-
sider himself prepared for the Bar until six years had
elapsed.1 It was during these years that Jefferson developed
an interest in the history and sociology of law which he re-
tained throughout his life and long after the routine practice
of law had ceased to interest him.
Concerning Jefferson's career as a lawyer, comparatively
little appears to be known.2 His biographers agree that he
was an excellent office-lawyer, preparing his cases with un-
usual thoroughness and great erudition. 3 But as a court room
lawyer he does not seem to have been promising. His knowl-
edge of law was unquestionably deep, his capacity for analytic
thinking exceptional, but he was deficient in the forensic
art which was the sine qua of success in the legal practice
of his time. Nevertheless during the years that he engaged
in law he was retained in an increasing number of cases and
appears to have derived a fair income from his effort. Retir-
ing from the law in 1774, he turned over his business to
Edmund Randolph; and although he retained his interest in
the profession, he never again engaged in regular practice.
In the speculative side of law Jefferson showed little
concern, but he became increasingly interested in the relation
of law to politics and to social institutions." His reading in
Lord Kame's Historical Law Tracts, in Sir John Dalrymple's
1. Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of Americanism(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1929), p. 28.
2. Little has been written aside from the general biographies about
this aspect of Jefferson's life; however, G. A. Finkelnburg wrote
an article on "Thomas Jefferson as a Lawyer," 39 Am. L. Rev.
321-329 (1905). The article appears to have been largely based
on the biographical sources.
3. George Tucker, The Life of Thomas Jefferson (Philadelphia:
Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1837) Vol. I, p. 45.
4. Charles M. Wiltse in Chapter VIII of The Jeffersonian Tradition in
American Democracy (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press,
1935), develops the sociological aspect of Jefferson's interest in law.
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Essay toward a General History of Feudal Property, and in
Francis Stoughton Sullivan's An Historical Treatise on the
Feudal Laws and the Constitution of the Laws of England
aroused his interest in the legal institutions of Saxon times
and he developed a curious theory of constitutional history
which governed much of his subsequent thinking on legal
and judicial questions. The Anglo-Saxons he believed had
originally lived under a code of unwritten custom and natural
law. The perversion of this simple code of law into a complex
and tortured system of judicial metaphysics Jefferson describ-
ed as the work of Norman lawyers, pious judges and grasping
clerics.5 Writing to Major John Cartwright in 1824 he de-
clared of the early Saxons:
Having driven out the former inhabitants of that part of
the island called England, they became aborigines as to you,
and your lineal ancestors. They doubtless had L constitution;
and although they have not left it in a written formula, to the
precise text of which you may always appeal, yet they have left
fragments of their history and laws, from which it may be
inferred with considerable certainty. Whatever their history
and laws show to have been practised with approbation, we may
presume was permitted by their constitution; whatever was not
so practiced was not permitted. And although this constitution
was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force
cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the
nation, by their perpetual demand of a restoration of their
Saxon laws; which shows they were never relinquished by the
will of the nation. In the pullings and haulings for these
ancient rights, between the nation, and its kings of the races
of Plantagenets, Tudors and Stuarts, there was sometimes gain,
and sometimes loss, until the final re-conquest of their rights
from the Stuarts. The destitution and expulsion of this race
broke the thread of pretended inheritance, extinguished all regal
usurpations, and the nation re-entered into all its rights; and
although in their bill of rights they specifically reclaimed some
only, yet the omission of the others was no renunciation of the
right to assume their exercise also, whenever occasion should
occur. The new King received no rights or powers, but those
expressly granted to him. It has ever appeared to me, that the
difference between the whig and the tory of England is, that
the whig deduces his rights from the Anglo-Saxon source, and
the tory from the Norman.6
Upon this conception of legal history Jefferson based his
5. To Thomas Cooper, Feb. 10, 1814, Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
ed. H. A. Washington (Washington, D.C.; Taylor & Maury, 1854)
VI, 311-19.
6. June 5, 1824. Ibid., VII, 355-56.
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first major political treatise, A Summary View of the Rights
of Britisk America, prepared in 1774 to influence the delibera-
tions of a general convention of the colony meeting at Wil-
liamsburg to consider the growing contention with the mother-
country. In this exposition, which Jefferson himself declared
was considered too bold to be adopted, he asserted:
... that our ancestors, before their emigration to America,
were the free inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe,
and possessed a right which nature has given to all men, of
departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has
placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of there
establishing new societies, under such laws and regulations as
to them shall seem most likely to promote public happiness. That
their Saxon ancestors had, under this universal law, in like
manner left their native wilds and woods in the north of Europe,
had possessed themselves of the island of Britain, then less
charged with inhabitants, and had established there that system
of laws which has so long been the glory and protection of that
country. Nor was ever any claim of superiority or dependence
asserted over them by that mother country from which they
had migrated; and were such a claim made, it is believed that his
Majesty's subjects in Great Britain have too firm a feeling of
the rights derived to them from their ancestors, to bow down
the sovereignty of their state before such visionary pretensions.
And it is thought that no circumstance has occurred to dis-
tinguish materially the British from the Saxon emigration.
America was conquered, and her settlement made, and firmly
established, at the expense of individuals, and not of the British
public. Their own blood was spilt in acquiring lands for their
settlements, their own fortunes expended in making that settle-
ment effectual; for themselves they fought, for themselves they
conquered, and for themselves alone they have right to hold.7
Jefferson's understanding of the relation of law to social
institutions was revealed in his denial of the title of the
British crown to the unoccupied lands of the colonies. De-
veloping his theme that law other than the law of nature was
binding only on the community which created it and not upon
those who emigrated to other lands, Jefferson denied that
the Norman system of land tenure could be applied to America
without the consent of the colonial inhabitants. "Feudal
holdings," he asserted, "were but .. .exceptions out of the
Saxon laws of possession under which all lands were held in
absolute right," and added, ...... America was not conquered
by William the Norman nor its lands surrendered to him, or
7. The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. P. L. Ford (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904) II, 64-65.
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any of his successors."8  Referring to this notion of legal
evolution, Jefferson inquired into the sources of the laws of
primogeniture, of entail and of the established church of
Virginia, and became convinced that these measures had no
basis in the law of nature observed by the Saxons. He there-
fore concluded that these laws represented the successful
efforts of medieval priests, jurists, and nobles to cover their
usurpation of popular liberties with the cloak of legality. He
concluded that such legalized privileges had no place in a
commonwealth of free men, and he labored with ultimate
success to secure their abolition in Virginia.
The natural law basis of Jefferson's legal philosophy
underlay all of his discussion on the causes and objectives of
the American revolution and achieved most notable expression
in The Declaration of Independence. With certain of the
revolutionary leaders, notably John Adams and young Alex-
ander Hamilton, the natural law arguments of the Declara-
tion were valuable primarily as political weapons to combat
the pretensions of the British ministry-arguments which
had served their purpose when independence was won.9 Not
so with Jefferson. Throughout his political and adminis-
trative career as Governor of Virginia, Minister Plenipotenti-
ary to the Court of France, Secretary of State for George
Washington, Vice President of the United States, and finally
as President, he refused to deviate from the principles which
he had expounded in the Summary View of 1774.
In his official opinion as Secretary of State upon the
question whether the President should veto the bill, declaring
that the seat of government should be transferred to the
Potomac in the year 1790, Jefferson took occasion to reiterate
his assumptions concerning the natural rights and law of
men.10
Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the
right of self-government. They receive it with their being
from the hand of nature. Individuals exercise it by their single
will; collections of men by that of their majority; for the law
of the majority is the natural law of every society of men.
When a certain description of men are to transact together a
particular business, the times and places of their meeting and
8. Ibid., p. 85.
9. John Adams, however, appears to have retained his faith in
natural law as a standard for human conduct. Benjamin F.
Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1931) pp. 150-55.
10. Wright, op. cit., pp. 155-59.
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separating, depend on their own will; they make a part of the
natural right of self-government. This, like all other natural
rights, may be abridged or modified in its exercise by their own
consent, or by the law of those who depute them, if they meet
in the right of others; but as far as it is not abridged or
modified, they retain it as a natural right, and may exercise
them in what form they please, either exclusively by them-
selves, or in association with others, or by others altogether,
as they shall agree."'
Jefferson never provided a complete catalogue of the
natural rights of men, but in a letter written in 1817 to Dr.
John Manners he listed some of them.1 2 He declared that
the right of expatriation belonged to men by natural law and
added that "the evidence of this natural right, like that of
our life, liberty, the use of our faculties, the pursuit of hap-
piness, is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations
of reason, but is impressed on the sense of every man."' 3
Natural right and natural law in Jefferson's mind seemed to
demark the sphere of individual conscience and ethics from
the area of political or social action. Natural law ruled in
those areas of conduct where he held that civil law might not
rightfully interfere to restrict. But to clearly perceive the
line between the two areas of law was not always easy.
The acquisition and ownership of property was deemed by
Jefferson a civil rather than a natural right.'4 How far he
believed the civil regulation of property might rightfully
interfere with "the guarantee to everyone of a free exercise
of his industry, and the fruits acquired by it" which he held
the first principle of association, 5 does not appear in his
writings; but he did maintain that the rights of an individual
-civil or natural-never extended to permit harm to the
equal rights of others.'6 Thus the acquisition and ownership
11. Writings, ed. Washington, VII, 496.
12. June 12, 1817, Works, ed. Ford, XII, 66.
13. Ibid. In a "Note on the Crimes Bill" (Writings ed., Washington,
I, 156) Jefferson suggested that severe punishment for minor
offenses was contrary to the laws of nature.
14. Chinard, op. cit., pp. 83-85; 233.
15. Note on Destutt de Tracy's Political Economy, April 6, 1816,
Writings, ed. Washington, VI, 575. Nevertheless in a letter to
Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813 (Jefferson's Writings, Memorial
edition [Washington, D.C.: T. Jefferson Mem. Asso. 1903-05]
XIII, 332-33) he declared that exclusive property rights
in ideas or inventions did not flow from natural law and ques-
tioned whether the civil rights granted by society for these im-
provements were not of greater embarrassment than advantage
to society.
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of property, according to Jeffersonian theory, appeared sub-
ject to civil control in so far as the support of government,
the prevention of injustice, and the provision for equal op-
portunity for all necessitated. But the distinction of property
ownership as a civil right did not imply an absolute right of
regulation upon the part of society. The latter-day distinc-
tion between "property rights" and "human rights" did not
therefore exist in Jeffersonian democracy, for the right to
the inoffensive possession of property was a human right
albeit not a natural right, and its guarantee was one of the
objects for which men formed societies.
Jefferson's contention that there were only two legiti-
mate sources of law in America-the law of nature and the
law enacted by the American people-is illustrated by his
opposition to the efforts of judges to read into the law of the
American commonwealth the English common law and the
precepts of the Christian church. He recognized the existence
of the common law in the states where by specific legislative
action it had been adopted. But the allegations of certain
federal judges during the controversy over the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798 that the common law was in force and
cognizable in federal courts, he described as the most formid-
able doctrine yet broached by the federal government.'
Writing to Edmund Randolph in 1799, he described this move
of the federal judiciary as an "audacious, barefaced and
sweeping pretension to a system of law for the United States,
without the adoption of their Legislature."' He declared
that if this assumption be yielded to, the state courts might
as well be shut up, "as there will then be nothing to hinder
citizens of the same State suing each other in the federal
courts in every case."'1
Jefferson noted in March of 1800 that the existence of a
federal common law was one of the heretical doctrines being
maintained in the United States Senate.20  In April of that
same year he observed, however, that the federalists were
16. Opinion on the question whether the United States have a right
to renounce their treaties with France, or to hold them sus-
pended till the government of that country shall be established,
pril 28, 1793 (Writings, ed. Washington, VII, 618).
17. August 18, 1799, Writings, ed. Washington, IV, 301-02.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The Anas, Works, ed. Ford, I, 353-54.
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beginning to qualify their arguments on behalf of federal
common law jurisdiction. 21
Writing to John Tyler in 1812, Jefferson described his
understanding of the degree to which the common law of
England could be properly applied in Virginia:
I deride with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought
with us from England the common law rights. This narrow
notion was a favorite in the first moment of rallying to our
rights against Great Britain. But it was that of men who felt
their rights before they had thought of their explanation. The
truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men; of ex-
patriated men. On our arrival here, the question would at
once arise, by what law will we govern ourselves? The resolu-
tion seems to have been, by that system with which we are
familiar, to be altered by ourselves occasionally, and adapted
to our new station.... But the state of the English law at the
date of our emigration, constituted the system adopted here.
We may doubt, therefore, the propriety of quoting in our courts
English authorities subsequent to that adoption; still more,
the admission of authorities posterior to the Declaration of
Independence, or rather to the accession of that King, whose
reign, ab initio, was the very tissue of wrongs which rendered
the Declaration at length necessary.2
Thanking the author of a volume on American Juris-
prudence, Jefferson reiterated his opinion that the common
law existed in America only by specific enactment and ob-
served with satisfaction that the Supreme Court had given
up its earlier pretensions on this subject.23
I am now too old to read books solidly, unless they promise
present amusement or future benefit. To me books of law
offer neither. But I read your 6th chapter with interest and
satisfaction, on the question whether the common law (of
England) makes a part of the laws of our general government?
That it makes more or less a part of the laws of the States is,
I suppose, an unquestionable fact. Not by birthright, a conceit
as inexplicable as the trinity, but by adoption. But, as to the
general government, the Virginia Report on the alien and
sedition laws, has so completely pulverized this pretension that
nothing new can be said on it. Still, seeing that judges of
the Supreme Court, (I recollect, for example, Elsworth and
21. Ibid., pp. 357-58.
22. June 17, 1812, Writings, ed. Washington, VI, 65.
23. Not until 1812 did the federal courts give up their claim to sus-
tain indictments under the English common law where no Ameri-
can statute governed. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32
(1812). Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (Boston & New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916-1919), III, 28.
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Story) had been found capable of such paralogism, I was glad
to see that the Supreme Court had given it up. In the case of
Libel in the United States district Court of Connecticut, the
rejection of it was certainly sound; because no law of the
general government had made it an offence. But such a case
might, I suppose, be sustained in the State Courts which have
state laws against libels. Because as to the portions of power
within each State assigned to the general government, the
President is as much the Executive of the State, as their
particular governor is in relation to State powers. 24
A favorite legal heresy which Jefferson continued to
combat was the notion that Christianity was a part of the
common law. In the appendix of Jefferson's Report of Cases
Determined in the General Court of Virginia is a curious
disquisition apparently written about 1764, which in his
words concerns "the most remarkable instance of Judicial
legislation that has ever occurred in English jurisprudence
or perhaps in any other. It is that of the adoption in mass
of the whole code of another nation, and its incorporation into
the legitimate system by the usurpation of the Judges alone,
without a particle of legislative will having ever been called
on, or exercised towards its introduction or confirmation."'25
The gist of Jefferson's argument was that the "pious judges"
of England by twisting the opinion of the Chief Justice,
Prisot, in a case heard during the reign of Henry VI had
covered all of the Hebrew Old Testament precepts, Christian
scriptures and ecclesiastical law into the common law of the
realm. "What a conspiracy this between Church and State,"
exclaimed Jefferson, "sing Tantarara, rogues all !,,26
Jefferson subsequently described this conspiracy to his
friend Thomas Cooper and to Major John Cartwright. When,
in October 1824, Edward Everett informed him that his
article was appearing in the newspapers, the octogenarian
iconoclast was disturbed at the prospect of drawing upon
him an angry "host of judges and divines." 2' 7 But he affirmed
that his argument was sound and that although "they may
cavil they cannot refute it. '28
24. To Mr. Goodenow, June 13, 1822, Writings, ed. Washington, VII,
251.
25. Works, ed. Ford, I, 453-54.
26. To Major John Cartwright, June 5, 1824, Writings, ed. Washing-
ton VII, 361.
27. To Edward Everett, October 15, 1824, ibid., VII, 381.
28. Ibid.
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To the historical accuracy of Jefferson's natural law
theories objections might easily be raised, and as one of his
more penetrating biographers has suggested, his legal notions
constituted "a sort of sublimation and legal justification of
the pioneer spirit. '29 But the importance of these theories to
the history of American law and government should not be
underestimated. Although gradually falling into disrepute
among the multitude of law-makers, administrators and
judges, the Jeffersonian conception of law was embodied in
the basic political document of the republic, the Declaration
of Independence and by virtue of the Bill of Rights was in-
corporated into the Constitution of the United States, which
in other respects represented a departure from the natural
law enthusiasm of 1776. Regardless of the law of Saxon
England or of the legal rights of the newcomers to the
American wilderness, a conception of law had been embodied
in the political tradition of the American people which
affirmed the existence of natural right and natural law. This
theory of law embodied in the documents which declared the
fundamental principles of the republic, though often ignored,
has never been repudiated by the great mass of the American
people; and no single individual is more responsible than
Thomas Jefferson for the persistence of the natural law con-
cept in American life.
The natural rights argument has been preeminently an
opposition argument, and as such has served better those who
disliked the course of political action than those who were
charged with the administration of public affairs. Neverthe-
less the argument of Jefferson remained in the patriotic
tradition of the nation and could always be drawn upon with
good effect in cases where encroachment upon the traditional
freedom of the American people seemed real. Thus the body
of natural law-natural rights tradition, even in disuse, has
afforded a salutory check upon the ambitions of public
officials and has been indeed an invisible bulwark against
the undue centralization of public power.
II
Jefferson's interest in the origin and application of law
led him to view it as a part of a more comprehensive science
of society. His understanding of the relation of law to other
29. Chinard, op. cit. p. 50.
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branches of knowledge is indicated by his advice to youthful
students on how best to prepare for the legal profession.
Writing to his cousin's son, Jefferson prescribed a course of
legal study which reflected his conception of the broad
range of the subject:
All that is necessary for a student is access to a library,
and directions in what order the books are to be read. This I
will take the liberty of suggesting to you, observing previously
that as other branches of science, and especially history, are
necessary to form a lawyer, these must be carried on together.
I will arrange the books to be read into three columns, and
propose that you should read those in the first column till 12.
o'clock every day: those in the 2d. from 12. to 2. those in the
3d. after candlelight, leaving all the afternoon for exercise
and recreation, which are as necessary as reading: I will
rather say more necessary, because health is worth more than
learning.
1st.
Coke on Littleton
Coke's 2d. 3d. & 4th
institutes.
Coke's reports.
Vaughan's do
Salkeld's
Ld. Raymond's
Strange's.
Burrows's
Kaim's Principles
of equity.
Vernon's reports.
Peere Williams.
Precedents in
Chancery.
Tracy Atheyns.
Verey.
2d.
Dalrymple's feudal
system.
Hale's history of the
Com. law.
Gilbert on Devises
Uses.
Tenures.
Rents
Distresses.
Ejectments.
Executions.
Evidence.
Sayer's law of costs.
Lambard's circonan-
tia.
Bacon. voce Pleas
& Pleadings
Cunningham's law of
bills.
Molloy de jure mari-
timo.
Locke on government.
3d.
Mallet's North anti-
quit'.
History of England in
3 vols. folio com-
piled by Kennet.
Ludlow's memoirs
Burnet's history.
Ld. Orrery's history.
Burke's George III
Robertson's hist.
of Scotl'd
Robertson's hist.
of America.
Other American
histories.
Voltaire's historical
works.
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Hawkin's Pleas of
the crown.
Blackstone. Montesquieu's Spirit
of law.
Virginia laws.
Smith's wealth of
nations.
Beccaria.
Kaim's moral essays.
Vattel's law of nations.
Should there be any little intervals in the day not otherwise
occupied fill them up by reading Lowthe's grammar, Blair's
lectures on rhetoric, Mason on poetic & prosaic numbers, Bol-
ingbroke's works for the sake of the stile, which is declama-
tory & elegant, the English poets for the sake of style also. 0
Politics, history, and treatises on public law occupy fully
half of the course which Jefferson prescribed. In a letter of
similar advice to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jefferson declared
The Wealth of Nations the best book on political economy ex-
tant, and recommended the Spirit of the Laws on government,
but warned against the political heresies which it contained.
"Locke's little book on government is perfect as far as it
goes," he declared, and added, "Descending from theory to
practice there is no better book than the Federalist." Burgh's
Political Disquisition he considered good "especially after
reading De Lolme." In addition he suggested several of
Hume's political essays, works by Turgot and the economists
of France, and for parliamentary knowledge Lex parlia-
mentaria.3
In a letter to Dabney Terrell, February 26, 1821, Jeffer-
son recommended a course of reading which in addition to
six hours of law per day, prescribed six or eight hours for
history, politics, ethics, physics, oratory, poetry and criticism
-all of which he declared "as necessary as law to an ac-
complished lawyer.13
2
30. To John Garland Jefferson, June 11, 1790, Works, ed. Ford, VI,
71-73. Jefferson objected to the want of system in the writings
of the English Chancellors and particularly in Lord Kames whom
he found 'too metaphysical"-to Peter Carr, June 22, 1792, Writ-
ings, ed. Washington, III, 452.
31. May 30, 1790, Works, ed. Ford, VI, 63.
32. Writings, ed. Washington, VII, 206-09.
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Very likely Jefferson's ideas of legal training reflected
his conviction that men of ability should devote a portion of
their careers to the public service. "There is a debt of service
due from every man to his country, proportioned to the
bounties which nature and fortune have measured to him,"
he maintained. 3 To a political career he deemed a knowledge
of law essential. "Carry on the study of the law with that
of politics and history," he wrote to young T. M. Randolph,
"Every political measure will, forever, have an intimate con-
nection with the laws of the land; and he who knows nothing
of these, will always be perplexed and often foiled by ad-
versaries having the advantage of that knowledge over him."3'
Jefferson's observations concerning the conduct of law-
yers in politics were not always complimentary. Writing to
President James Madison shortly before the outbreak of war
with Great Britain in 1812, Jefferson expressed his doubt
"whether in case of war, Congress would find it practicable
to do their part of the business," and added, "that a body
containing 100 lawyers in it, should direct the measures of a
war, is, I fear impossible." 3' Jefferson declared in a letter to
Benjamin Austin of Vermont written in 1816 that lawyers
had multiplied in Virginia "as to be almost a grievance, and
by their numbers in the public councils, have wrested from the
public hand the direction of the pruning knife."' 6
Writing to Dr. Thomas Cooper in 1814 he remarked, "I
am sure you join me in lamenting the general defection of
lawyers and judges from the free principles of government.
I am sure they do not derive this degenerate spirit from the
father of our science, Lord Coke.37 But it may be the reason
why they cease to read him and why they are now called
'Blackstone lawyers.' "38
Jefferson's objection to the young lawyers of his day
seems to have derived, in part at least, from his belief that
33. To Edward Rutledge, Dec. 27, 1796, Works, ed. Ford, VII, 258-59.
34. July 6, 1787, Writings, ed. Washington, II, 176.
35. February 19, 1812, Works, ed. Ford, XI, 226.
36. January 9, 1816, Works, ed. Ford, XI, 500.
37. Jefferson's admiration for Coke was evidently a product of ma-
turity for as a law student in 1762 he wrote a friend, "Well,
Page, I do wish the Devil had old Coke, for I am sure I never was
so tired of an old dull scoundrell in my life." (December 25,
1762, Writings, Memorial edition, IV, 3).
38. January 16, 1814, Writings, ed. Washington, VI, 296.
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few of them were properly qualified to pursue their profes-
sion. Writing to John Tyler in 1810, Jefferson declared:
I have long lamented with you the depreciation of law
science. The opinion seems to be that Blackstone is to us what
the Alcoran is to the Mahometans, that everything which is
necessary is in him, and what is not in him is not necessary.
I still lend my counsel and books to such young students as
will fix themselves in the neighborhood. Coke's institutes and
reports are their first, and Blackstone their last book, after
an intermediate course of two or three years. It is nothing
more than an elegant digest of what they will then have ac-
quired from the real fountains of the law. Now men are born
scholars, lawyers, doctors; in our day this was confined to
poets.39
In another letter to Tyler written two years later, Jef-
ferson declared that Blackstone's book "although the most
elegant and best digested in our law catalogue, has been per-
verted more than all others, to the degeneracy of legal sci-
ence. A student finds there a smattering of everything,"
he explained, "and his indolence easily persuades him that
if he understands that book, he is master of the whole body
of the law. The distinction between these, and those who
have drawn their stores from the deep and rich mines of
Coke Littleton," he added, "seems well understood even by
the unlettered common people who apply the appellation of
Blackstone lawyers to these ephemeral insects of the law."'40
Writing to Horatio G. Spafford in 1814, Jefferson again
deplored the defection of the lawyers in England and Ameri-
ca from the free principles of their constitutions. 41 In truth
Blackstone and Hume had made tories of all England, he
declared, and asserted that they were making tories of those
young Americans whose native feelings of independence did
not place them above the wily sophistries of these publicists.
He averred that the books of these two "have done more
toward the suppression of the liberties of man, than all the
millions of men in arms of Bonaparte," and added, "I
fear nothing for our liberty from the assaults of force; but
I have seen and feel much, and fear more from English books,
39. May 26, 1810, ibid., V, 524-25.
40. June 17, 1812, ibid., VI, 66.
41. March 17, 1814, ibid., VI, 335.
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English prejudices, English manners, and the apes, the dupes
and designs among our professional crafts." 42
The close relationship which Jefferson saw in law to
politics strengthened his belief that law must apply political
opinion, and where it fails to reflect the considered judg-
ment of the community it should no longer be held valid.
In this conception of law as an instrument of political action
lies the explanation of many of Jefferson's better known
constitutional principles: his opposition to judge-made law;
his belief that the laws of one generation could not rightfully
bind another; his insistence on the equal right of the three
departments of government to construe the meaning of the
law in areas of their respective jurisdiction.
He declared that laws and institutions must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind. "As that be-
comes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries
are made, new truths disclosed, the manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
change also, and keep pace with the times. ' 43 He maintained
that "we might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." 44
"Each generation," said Jefferson, "has the usufruct
of the earth during the period of its continuance. When it
ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to the succeeding
generation, free and unincumbered, and so on successively,
from one generation to another forever. '45 He believed that
each generation should be considered as a distinct nation
"with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves,
but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the
42. Ibid; Jefferson particularly disliked involved and technical legal
language. Sending a draft of An Act for Establishing Elementary
Schools he apologized for neglecting to employ the conventional
legal terminology. "You however, can easily correct this bill
to the taste of my brother lawyers, by making every other word
a 'said' or 'aforesaid' and saying everything over two or three
times, so that nobody but we of the craft can untwist the diction,
and find out what it means." September 9, 1817, Writings, Me-
morial edition, XVII, 418.
43. To Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, Works, ed. Ford, XII, 12.
44. Ibid.
45. To John Wayles Eppes, June 24, 1813, Works, ed. Ford, XI, 298.
See also Jefferson's lengthy discussion of this theory in his letter
to James Madison written in Paris, Sept. 6, 1789, Writings, ed.
Washington, III, 102-09.
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inhabitants of another country."' 6 By calculation Jefferson
concluded that at intervals of approximately nineteen years
the majority of the adults of one generation would be re-
placed in active life by their decendents. Hence, he believed
that the constitution and laws of nations should be submit-
ted for reconsideration at intervals of not more than twenty
years47 and held that the public debt of a nation should
never be spread over more than a nineteen year interval for
amortization.4 8
When Jefferson was asked to recommend a constitution
for a French Agricultural and Manufacturing Society which
proposed to establish a colony on the Tombigbee River, he
refused, explaining that "the laws which must effect this
(their happiness) must flow from their habits, their own
feelings, and the resources of their own minds. No stranger
to these," he explained, "could possibly propose regulations
adapted to them." 4"
The adaptability of law to human needs was Jefferson's
test of its moral justification. Where the law impeded so-
cial welfare, Jefferson declared the law unjust and advocated
its change.50 Yet he would guard against too rapid change
for he recognized the necessity of stability in the social
structure. Writing to Madison in 1787, he declared, "The
instability of our laws is really an immense evil,""' and pro-
posed a twelve-month interval between the engrossing of a
bill and the passing of it or passage by a two-thirds rather
than a majority vote if speedier action was needful.
Jefferson's conception of law is well illustrated by his
theories concerning its interpretation. In his opinion on the
validity of the French treaties, April 28, 1793, he described
the method by which natural law was to be ascertained:
Questions of natural right are triable by their conformity
with the moral sense and reason of man. Those who write
treatises of natural law, can only declare what their own
moral sense and reason dictate in the several cases they state.
Such of them as happen to have feelings and a reason coin-
46. Ibid.
47. To Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, Works, ed. Ford, XII, 12-13.
48. ,To John Wayles Eppes, June 24, 1813, Works, ed. Ford, XI,
297-301; ibid, Sept. 11, 1813, Works, ed. Ford, XI, 309.
49. To William Lee, January 16, 1817, Writings, ed. Washington,
VII, 56.
50. To LaFayette, April 11, 1787, Writings, Memorial edition, VI, 108.
51. December 20, 1787, Works, ed. Ford, V, 375.
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cident with those of the wise and honest part of mankind,
are respected and quoted as witnesses of what is morally
right or wrong in particular cases. Grotius, Puffendorf,
Wolf, and Vattel are of this number. Where they agree their
authority is strong; but where they differ, (and they often
differ), we must appeal to our own feelings and reason to
decide between them.52
In the interpretation of natural law no man nor divison
of the government held a monopoly; and similarly in the
construction of the constitution of the republic, Jefferson
held that each of the agencies entrusted by the people with
the upholding of the constitution was entitled to judge of
its meaning in cases properly within its jurisdiction. "The
leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary of one another," he de-
clared.53 Accordingly he held that each division of the gov-
ernment "has an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its
action, and especially where it is to act ultimately and with-
out appeal."5 4 Whether Jefferson's argument merely amount-
ed to a denial that the judiciary could bind the executive or
legislature on political questions or extended to an independ-
ent right of general constitutional interpretation is not clear.55
Jefferson declared that he pardoned offenders of the Sedition
Act of 1798 because although passed by the Congress and
therefore presumably deemed constitutional by it, Jefferson
declared that he, as President, considered the measure un-
constitutional, null, and therefore refused to enforce it.6
In the interpretation of statutory law the executive en-
joyed no such independence of construction, for if the measure
was within the scope of permissive constitutional power, Jef-
ferson held that the intention of the legislature governed its
construction. "The true key for the construction of every-
thing doubtful in a law, is the intention of the law-makers,"
he declared to Albert Gallatin. 57
52. Writings, ed. Washington, VII, 618.
53. To George Hay, June 20, 1807, Works, ed. Ford, X, 404.
54. To Judge Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819, ibid, XII, 137.
55. To consider judges as final arbiters of constitutional questions
he described as "a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and, one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy." (To
William Jarvis, September 28, 1820, Writings, Memorial edition,
XV, 277.)
56. To Judge Spencer Roane, loc. cit.
57. May 20, 1808, Writings, ed. Washington, V, 291.
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. To the criterion of legislative intention as a guide to
executive interpretation of statutes Jefferson repeatedly re-
ferred. Writing to Albert Gallatin on a point of law, he de-
clared, "We are to look at the intention of the Legislature,
and to carry it into execution while the lawyers are nibbling
at the words of the law. It is well known," he added, "that
on every question the lawyers are about equally divided, as
is seen in the present case, and were we to act where no con-
trary opinion of a lawyer can be had, we should never act."58
In cases where the word of the law could bear two meanings,
the true purpose of the legislature in enacting the measure
was to determine its application. "In a statute as in a will,
the intention of the party is to sought after," he said.5 9
In a letter to W. H. Cabell, the Governor of Virginia in
1807, Jefferson developed at some length his theory of the
executive interpretation:
In the construction of a law, even in judiciary cases of
meum et tuum, where the opposite parties have a right and
counter-right in the very words of the law, the judge considers
the intention of the law-giver as his true guide, and gives to
all the parts and expressions of the law, that meaning which
will effect, instead of defeating, its intention. But in laws
merely executive, where no private right stands in the way,
and the public object is the interest of all, a much freer
scope of construction, in favor of the intention of the law,
ought to be taken, and ingenuity ever should be exercised in
devising constructions, which may save to the public the bene-
fit of the law. Its intention is the important thing: the means
of attaining it quite subordinate. It often happens that,
the Legislature prescribing details of execution, some circum-
stance arises, unforseen or unattended to by them, which would
totally frustrate their intention, were their details scrupulously
adhered to, and deemed exclusive of all others. But construc-
tions must not be favored which go to defeat instead of fur-
thering the principal object of their law, and to sacrifice the
end to the means. It being as evidently their intention that
the end shall be attained as that it should be effected by
any given means, if both cannot be observed, we are equally
free to deviate from the one as the other, and more rational
in postponing the means to the end.
... . It is further to be considered that the Constitution
gives the executive a general power to carry the laws into
execution. If the present law had enacted that the service
of thirty thousand volunteers should be accepted, without
saying anything of the means, those means would, by the
58. September 20, 1808, Writings, ed. Washington, V, 369.
59. Ibid., July 29, 1808, V, 328.
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Constitution, have resulted to the discretion of the executive.
So if means specified by an act are impracticable, the consti-
tutional power remains, and supplies them. Often the means
provided specially are affirmative merely, and, with the con-
stitutional powers, stand well together; so that either may
be used, or the one supplementary to the other. This aptitude
of means to the end of a law is essentially necessary for those
which are executive; otherwise the objection that our govern-
ment is an impracticable one, would really be verified.60
To this notion of executive discretion in the method of
effecting the purpose of the legislature, Jefferson did not
read an independence of executive judgment as sweeping
as one might infer from his language. In times of national
danger this latitude of discretion was expanded, and as
governor of revolutionary Virginia he had admonished the
county magistrates that "he is a bad citizen who can enter-
tain a doubt whether the Law will justify him in saving his
Country, or who will scruple to risk himself in support of
the spirit of a Law, where unavoidable accidents have pre-
vented literal compliance with it." 61
In a letter written in 1810 Jefferson described the oc-
casions upon which he deemed the performance of ultra
vires acts the duty of a public officer:
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not some-
times occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to
assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in
principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict
observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when
in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by
a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the
law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to
the means.6 2
That he did not consider the exceeding of lawful powers
as permissible on any except the most urgent occasions and
then only upon the part of the highest officers of the state,
appears from his explanation that justification for ultra
vires acts did not apply "to the case of persons charged with
petty duties where the consequences are trifling, and time
60. August 11, 1807, Writings, ed. Washington, V, 158-59.
61. Works, ed. Ford (1889 edition) II, 431.
62. To J. B. Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810, Writings, ed. Washington, V, 512.
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allowed for a legal course, nor to authorize them to take
such cases out of the written law." In these, he believed,
"The example of overleaping the law is of greater evil than
a strict adherence to its imperfect provisions. It is incum-
bent on those only who accept of great charges," he declared,
"to risk themselves on great occasions when the safety of
the nation or its very high interests are at stake. 3 He con-
fessed that the line of discrimination between proper and
improper occasions for the exceeding of powers might be
difficult to ascertain, but he declared, "The good officer is
bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on
the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives."64
III
Unquestionably the greatest constructive contribution
of Thomas Jefferson to the development of American law
and jurisprudence was his work in the rebuilding of the
legal system of Virginia, destroyed by the revolution. As a
member of the Virginia Committee of Revisors6 5 appointed
November 5, 1776, he worked during the following three
years to bring the legal system of the independent common-
wealth into line with republican principles. Although much
of this effort was devoted to clearing away the debris of the
aristocratic colonial order, his proposed bill for religious
freedom, for the creation of public schools, and for the es-
tablishment of free public libraries remain a monument to
his intelligence and civic spirit. The details of Jefferson's
work as a revisor of the laws of Virginia are recounted in
his Autobiographky and have been more objectively related
by his biographers.6  To the student of jurisprudence, the
significance of Jefferson's proposals is in the utilitarian
attitude with which he approached legal questions.
For Jefferson the law held no peculiar mystery, no par-
ticular claim to reverence. His interest in law was in its
social, its political application. He found in law a useful
instrument for effecting social reform. He did not believe
63. Ibid, p. 544.
64. Ibid.
65. The other revisors were George Wythe, Jefferson's old mentor;
George Mason, Edmund Pendleton and Thomas L. Lee. The
retirement of Mason and the death of Lee left Jefferson, Wythe,
and Pendleton to complete the work.
66. E.g. Randall, Chinard, Tucker, etc.
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that law was designed to preserve the status quo. On the
contrary, he believed its adaptive change to social needs the
best guarantee of a peaceful and progressive society. He
had seen the static order of old France break down into
chaotic revolution, and attributed the collapse of the old
regime throughout all Europe to the resistance of the priv-
ileged orders to legal change.6 7 It is in this idea of law as
an instrument of peaceful social change that Jefferson rec-
onciled order with his conception of progress. Yet he did
not strain the meaning of order. "I like a little rebellion
now and then," he wrote to Abigail Adams, "It is like a
storm in the atmosphere." 68  Nor did his conception of
progress require vast changes in the social system of America.
Slavery he would see abolished; manufacturing he would re-
strain to the necessities for American health and comfort;
great inequalities in wealth he would discourage; public ed-
ucation he would provide for all-but beyond these things
American life, as it was, seemed good to him. A comparison
of America with Europe he likened to a comparison of Heaven
with Hell, with England in an intermediate station.6'
Of the liberal, humane and progressive character of Jef-
ferson's jurisprudence there can be no question. For him
the ends of law and politics were identical with the purpose
of government: "to secure the greatest degree of happiness
possible to the general mass of those associated under it. ''7°
The method of progress toward this goal was gradual, and,
where the laws were wisely framed and administered, it was
peaceful. Jefferson preached no world-shaking social turn-
over, and only as a patriot of 1776 was he revolutionary.
No better descriptive title has been accorded him than the
one with which the historian John Fiske entitled a biograph-
ical sketch: "Thomas Jefferson the Conservative Reformer."71
67. To Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, Work, ed. Ford, XII, 12.
68. To Mrs. John Adams, Feb. 22, 1787, Works, ed. Ford, V, 263.
69. To Joseph Jones, August 14, 1787, ibid., V, 332.
70. To Vander Kemp, March 22, 1812, Writings, ed. Washington, VI. 45.
71. Essays, Historical and Literary, No. I (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1902).
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The Legislative Reference Bureau has compiled a digest
of the Acts passed by the 1943 Indiana General Assembly.
Members of the Association may obtain copies of this digest
by writing to the Secretary, Thomas C. Batchelor, 703 Union
Title Building, Indianapolis.
